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10 Attorneys for Defendant	
11 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZON IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAVAPAI	NA
13   STATE OF ARIZONA, ) No. P1300CR20081339	)
Plaintiff, ) Div. 6	
16 vs. ) DEFENDANT'S OBJE 17 STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER, ) WITNESS TO TESTIF 18 Defendant. ) 19 )	OR
21 Steven DeMocker, by and through counsel, hereby responds to the	e State's
22 Motion for Witness to Testify Via Video Link and requests that the Court	t deny the
23 State's Motion. This response is based on the Due Process Clause, the Co	onfrontation
Clause, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and Arizona	counterparts,
Arizona Rules of Evidence, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the	following
Memorandum of Points and Authorities.	
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## **Memorandum of Points and Authorities**

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions an accused has the right to be

"confronted with the witnesses against him." The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the clause to "guarantee[] the defendant a face-to-face meeting with
witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." *Coy v. Iowa*, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108

S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988). Face-to-face, in-court testimony serves several
purposes: (1) it "ensures the reliability of the evidence by allowing the trier of fact to
observe the demeanor, nervousness, expressions, and other body language of the
witness"; (2) it "impresses upon the witness the seriousness of the matter and ensures
that statements are given under oath"; and (3) it "helps assure the identity of the witness,
that the witness is not being coached or influenced during testimony, and that the
witness is not improperly referring to documents." *United States v. Hamilton*, 107 F.3d
499, 503 (7th Cir.1997).

The Supreme Court has explained, "a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured." *Maryland v. Craig,* 497 U.S. 836, 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3166, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990). The Eleventh Circuit, in applying this test has acknowledged that "[t]he simple truth is that confrontation through a video monitor is not the same as physical face-to-face confrontation." *United States v. Yates,* 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006). See also *United States v. Bordeaux,* 400 F.3d 548, 554-55 (8th Cir.2005). The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to confront one's accuser is most certainly compromised when the confrontation occurs through an electronic medium. In *Yates,* the Court reversed a conviction where a critical witness who refused to travel from Australia was permitted

to testify by live video feed. "[T]he prosecutor's need for the video conference testimony to make a case and to expeditiously resolve it are not the type of public policies that are important enough to outweigh the Defendants' rights to confront their accusers face-to-face." *Yates*, 438 F.3d at 1316. The Court focused on the commonality of circumstances in criminal cases and the availability of a Rule 15 deposition. The *Yates* court elaborated,

The district court made no case-specific findings of fact that would support a conclusion that this case is different from any other criminal prosecution in which the Government would find it convenient to present testimony by two-way video conference. All criminal prosecutions include at least some evidence crucial to the Government's case, and there is no doubt that many criminal cases could be more expeditiously resolved were it unnecessary for witnesses to appear at trial. If we were to approve introduction of testimony in this manner, on this record, every prosecutor wishing to present testimony from a witness overseas would argue that providing crucial prosecution evidence and resolving the case expeditiously are important public policies that support the admission of testimony by two-way video conference. See, e.g., Remote Testimony-A Prosecutor's Perspective, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 719 (2002).

Craig requires that furtherance of the important public policy make it *necessary* to deny the defendant his right to a physical face-to-face confrontation. 497 U.S. at 852, 110 S.Ct. at 3167.

Mr. Ray was late disclosed as an expert on cell phone towers, with less than three months before the start of trial on February 18. No report, CV or other information about his testimony was disclosed at that time. During Mr. Ray's interview the State indicated that he intended to present the jury with a PowerPoint created by Mr. Ray (which was likewise late disclosed). Now, in the middle of trial, the State proposed to introduce complicated expert testimony regarding cell towers by remote video

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The defense acknowledges that given the circumstances, the equivalent of a Rule 15 deposition is not possible in this case.

conference with Afghanistan. The State acknowledges that it knows of no way to use the PowerPoint given the proposed method of testimony. Furthermore, given the tortured history of the State's provision of laptops to facilitate communication between defense counsel and Mr. DeMocker, within Arizona, which took several hours of computer expert and attorney time, and multiple attempts, the feasibility of presenting testimony in this way is highly questionable. An additional issue is the weight and emphasis the jury may place on the testimony given that it is presented in such an unusual fashion.

In this case, there simply is no necessity of the type *Craig* contemplates. There is likewise no particular guarantee of trustworthiness as is required. This is particularly true where the testimony relates to expert, as opposed to factual, testimony.

The defense certainly appreciates that Mr. Ray is fighting for his country overseas and observes that his service is, of course, much appreciated and admired. However the State has failed to meet the burden required under *Craig* to subjugate Mr. DeMocker's right to confront the evidence against him.

DATED this 14<sup>th</sup> day of October, 2010.

By:

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1	ORIGINAL of the foregoing hand delivered for
2	filing this 14 <sup>th</sup> day of October, 2010, with:
3	Jeanne Hicks
4	Clerk of the Court Yavapai County Superior Court
5	120 S. Cortez
6	Prescott, AZ 86303
7	<b>COPIES</b> of the foregoing hand delivered this this 14 <sup>th</sup> day of October, 2010, to:
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9	The Hon. Warren R. Darrow Judge Pro Tem B
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11	rescou, AZ 80303
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